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Example of last year's Part II of DCI's Perspectives.

#### Part II—The Role of Intelligence

1. *General.* The primary charge on intelligence during these years will be to provide accurate and pertinent information and assessments with respect to the increased range of problems requiring US decision. In particular, the need will be for advance notifications of forthcoming policy problems and, of course, for tactical early warning as well. These responsibilities will be especially important in an era of accelerating events so that diplomacy, negotiation, or other benign initiatives can head off military confrontations between states or other disruptive events. The acceleration of events and the explosion of information will also require a major effort by the intelligence community to identify major policy and negotiating issues, to process raw information into manageable form, and to devise adequate techniques to identify for consumers the essential elements of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments, and the likely impact of alternative policy decisions. Intelligence will increasingly be expected to provide assessments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign powers, in addition to their basic capabilities. To do this will require interdisciplinary analysis which melds economic, technological, sociological and cultural factors with political and military data.

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2. *The USSR.* The USSR will remain as the major intelligence target. Its military power, its economic role in the world, and its foreign policies will continue to pose major problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and economic activity. It must follow Soviet efforts to acquire advanced scientific and technological assistance and the potential impact on both military and economic capabilities. It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet political dynamics and intentions. These must be supplemented by clear and accurate forecasts of likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic, and military fields. While a small percentage of this material will become available through open exchange and access, vast fields of highly important information will be kept by the Soviets within a closed society, requiring extraordinary efforts to obtain and understand them. A particular requirement will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitation agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field special attention will be focused on Soviet research and development, in particular with respect to weapons and supporting systems which could substantially affect the balance of power. These will include antisubmarine warfare, ballistic missiles, satellites and advanced-technology systems. Intelligence will be required to identify and maintain a base-line capability for tactical intelligence coverage, for rapid augmentation in case of local or general confrontation or conflict. Trends and actions in Soviet leadership and political doctrine will be a major subject of interest to assist in negotiations and to warn of undesirable developments ahead. The Soviet role abroad, either directly through diplomatic means or indirectly through party or subversive means, will be a matter of particular attention with respect to the turbulence of the Third World.

3. *China.* China will continue to be a second but still important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese society will make it difficult to assess any turmoil within the country or threats China might pose abroad. The latter will become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows and comes to include capabilities against the United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political activities and intentions in view of China's influence in the Far East and ties with and aspirations in the Third World.

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Europe will be a constant collection and assessment target, in order to determine political developments vis-a-vis the USSR and the military and political strength the East European nations individually and collectively bring to the Warsaw Pact.

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6. *Other Priorities.* Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of and explain new situations posing problems to American interests. An example will be to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third World countries, so the component elements of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require intensified efforts on our part to understand and communicate the differences between societies, cultures, and nation personalities. Intelligence will be called upon more often to assess the threat of terrorists against US installations and private enterprises abroad and, beyond that, the risk that some terrorists may acquire nuclear weapons.

7. A few of the major problems which will be either the subject of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence requirements, can be listed:

(a) Rates of production, consumption, and pricing of raw materials and energy sources and international commodity arrangements;

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25X6A(e) Arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, and crisis avoidance;

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NOTES

KIO 29 DEALS WITH TWO BASIC PROBLEMS:

-- FORCE CAPABILITIES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES.

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FORCE CAPABILITIES

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-- SIMILAR PAPERS TO BE DOEN ON COUNTRIES INDICATED.

-- WOULD LIKE SOME DIVISION OF EFFORT BETWEEN DIA  
AND CIA IN THESE PAPERS.

INTENTIONS TO COMMIT FORCES

-- WOULD LIKE INR TO PARTICIPATE HERE AS WELL AS CIA  
OR DIA.

PROGRAM FOR RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION OF THESE PAPERS. WILL  
FOLLOW GENERALLY ALONG THESE LINES:





-- FOR EACH OF THE PROJECTS THE DRAFTER WILL BE  
RESPONSIBLE FOR PRODUCING WITHIN TWO WEEKS AN  
OUTLINE FOR THE NIO.

-- FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE OF THE OUTLINE BY THE  
NIO THE DRAFTER WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR  
SURVEYING THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND  
PRESENTING TO THE NIO A GENERAL COLLECTION  
AND RESEARCH PROGRAM DESIGNED TO COMPLETE  
THE COLLECTION AND RESEARCH NECESSARY  
WITHIN FOUR MONTHS.

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- WE EXPECT ~~THAT~~ AT THE END OF FIVE MONTHS, THAT A DRAFT WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE NIO. COORDINATING AND REDRAFTING WILL FOLLOW.
- TIME PERIODS LISTED ABOVE ARE NOMINAL AND NEED NOT BE AS LONG AND MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT LONGER THAN THOSE SUGGESTED.

SUMMARY OF RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

<u>AGENCY/COMPONENT</u>	<u>ANALYTIC EFFORT</u>	<u>DATA BASES</u>	<u>KIQ NOS.</u>
<u>DIA, CIA</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Insufficient analysts.</li> <li>Need improved analytic methodologies.</li> </ul>	25X1X2 	26, 27, 28 26
<u>DIA/DI</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Divert analytic resources and create new branch,</li> </ul>	25X1X2 	25, 26, 27, 28
<u>DIA and Services</u>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish data base.</li> </ul>	25, 26, 27, 28, 29
<u>NPIC</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Insufficient PIs.</li> </ul>	25X1X2 	28
<u>NSA</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Insufficient analytic resources. Need to refocus exploitation and production effort.</li> </ul>	25X1X2 	25, 28

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4/17/75

SECTION A: KIQ PERFORMANCE REPORT  
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION--INSTRUCTIONS

PART I--EVALUATION OF KIQ FULFILLMENT

A. Overall Performance Evaluation. A summary description of the overall degree of fulfillment\* of the KIQ and, where relevant, an assessment of the major factors responsible for failures or successes in performance.

Discussion of the reactions of major policy-level consumers where these reactions are at variance with the NIO judgment of overall degree of fulfillment.

B. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Collection Objectives and Relative Contribution of Collection Methods. An amplification of the NIO judgment as to adequacy of collection against the KIQ as a whole.

Description of the degree of fulfillment of those collection objectives specified in the FY-75 strategy statement where the adequacy of performance differed substantially from the overall adequacy of performance against this KIQ, and, where relevant, a discussion of the factors responsible for these relative successes or failures.

(Note: NIO judgments of the degree of fulfillment of each collection objective specified in the FY-75 strategy statement will be entered in the Objectives portion of the table of Annex A to the KIQ Performance Assessment. A numerical assessment of the proportionate contribution of each collection method to the information gain for the KIQ as a whole and for each collection objective specified in the FY-75 strategy statement will be entered in the table at Annex B.)

C. Evaluation of Performance with respect to Production Objectives. An amplification of the NIO judgment as to adequacy of production against the KIQ as a whole.

\* Common Terminology for Narrative Evaluations

Completely fulfilled  
Almost completely fulfilled  
Substantially fulfilled  
Partially fulfilled  
Largely unfulfilled  
Almost totally unfulfilled  
Totally unfulfilled

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Description of the degree of fulfillment of those production objectives specified in the FY-75 strategy statement where the adequacy of performance differed substantially from the overall adequacy of performance against this KIQ, and where relevant, a discussion of the factors responsible for these relative successes or failures. (Note: NIO judgments of the degree of fulfillment of each production objective specified in the FY-75 strategy statement will be entered in the Objectives portion of the table of Annex A.)

## PART II--EVALUATION OF AGENCY COMMITMENTS

A. Collection Programs. A critical evaluation of the performance against the collection commitments of the KIQ as a whole made by those IC elements that accepted collection commitments in the FY-75 strategy statement. Enter the degree of fulfillment of the commitment in the Commitment portion of the table contained in Annex A.

B. Production Programs. A critical evaluation of the performance against the production commitments of the KIQ as a whole made by those IC elements that accepted production commitments in the FY-75 strategy statement. Enter the degree of fulfillment of the commitment in the Commitment portion of the table contained in Annex A.

## PART III--GENERAL NIO COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(If, and only if, the responsible NIO feels comments or recommendations are called for.)

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SECTION A: KIQ PERFORMANCE REPORT

ANNEX A. KIQ DEGREE OF FULFILLMENT TABLE

KIQ NO.: \_\_\_\_\_ KIQ: \_\_\_\_\_

Preparing NIO: \_\_\_\_\_

	Complete	Almost Complete	Substantial	Partial	Largely Unfilled	Almost Totally Unfilled	Totally Unfilled
KIQ, as a whole							
Objectives							
<u>Collection</u>							
Objective #1							
Objective #2							
Objective #3							
Objective #4							
<u>Production</u>							
Objective #1							
Objective #2							
Objective #3							
Agency Commitments							
<u>Collection</u>							
Commitment #1							
Commitment #2							
Commitment #3							
Commitment #4							
<u>Production</u>							
Commitment #1							
Commitment #2							

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SECTION A: KIQ PERFORMANCE REPORT;

ANNEX B. RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF COLLECTION METHODS

KIQ NO.: \_\_\_\_\_ KIQ: \_\_\_\_\_

Preparing NIO: \_\_\_\_\_

		25X1D6b				COLLECTION METHODS							25X1X1		Total
		25X1D1	25X1D2a		Other Sensors <sup>1/</sup> (Specify)	Clandes- tine <sup>2/</sup> (Specify)	Mil Attache	Forn Serv Rptg (State)		Domestic Contact (CIA)	DOD Non- NFIP <sup>3/</sup>	Non-NFIP Agencies <sup>4/</sup> (Specify)			
25X1D3a	KIQ													100	
OBJECTIVE	#1													100	
	#2													100	
	#3													100	
	#4													100	
	#5													100	
	#6													100	
	#7													100	
	#8													100	
	#9													100	
	#10													100	
#11													100		
#12													100		
#13													100		
														100	

<sup>1/</sup> Specify AEDS, RADINT, ACOUSTINT or IR.

<sup>2/</sup> Specify CIA, DOD/NFIP, or Defectors. ("Clandestine" includes all GDIP clandestine activities and resources.)

<sup>3/</sup> Collection Methods not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. (Includes services and U&S Commands and other Operational Mil. Organizations.) The NFIP consists of resources for CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA and certain collection activities.

<sup>4/</sup> Non-National Foreign Intelligence Program Agencies. Specify ERDA, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, FDA, Others.